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Abstract
We find a remarkable time persistence of various proxies for the
kurtosis (p-kurtosis) of the intraday returns distribution for the S&P500
index and this permits a significant measure of their evolution from
1983 to 2004. There appears a long time scale dramatic variation of
the p-kurtosis uncorrelated with the variation of the volatility thus
falsifying any hypothesis of a universal shape for the probability dis-
tribution of the returns. A large increase in the kurtosis anticipates
the October 87 crash. During the years 1991-2003 it continuously de-
creases even when the volatility grows during the dot-com bubble. We
propose some speculative interpretations of these results.
1 Introduction
The availability of high frequency intraday data generated by Stock Mar-
kets presents a challenge: how to manipulate that amount of data to derive
the maximum amount of meaningful results from it. Economists (econome-
tricians), psychologists and even physicists, with their respective methods
and working hypotheses, are confronting this challenge. This paper is still
another try. We will show that there is another collective variable that char-
acterises the state of the market in addition to index quotes and volatilities
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and that the time evolution of this variable can be measured in the sense that
its signal is larger than the noise. In this paper, for concreteness, state of the
market refers to its principal component as seen through the observation of
the S&P500 index.
The alert reader may object what is the purpose of measuring something
if it is not first embedded in a theoretical framework. We postpone this
question because our motivation originated in a long detour through episte-
mological/psychological considerations and is highly speculative. Still here
we can say the following: the market agent takes decisions in the middle of
uncertainties. Since the work of Knight (1921) we believe there are 2 types
of uncertainties: risk that can be modeled through consistent probability
distributions, and proper uncertainty or ambiguity that is more resistant to
formalization. Still Bewley (2002), Gilboa (2009), Schmeidler (1989) have
tried to formalize this kind of uncertainty and derived from it some idiosyn-
cratic behaviors: inertia, indeterminateness, uncertainty aversion. It has also
been proposed that there should be traces of it in the market behavior (Basili
(2001), Mukerji and Tallon (2003) and references therein). This context then
justifies, at least partially, the search for a new parameter characterizing the
market state because just one, namely the value of volatility at time t could
not measure both risk and uncertainty at time t 1
The following general framework is adopted: the data of the S&P500
returns time series are understood as extracted from a statistical sample
obeying a distribution whose parameters vary with time. This is not con-
troversial and in fact the time dependences of two of these parameters, the
volatility and the mean return, are usually discussed in the literature. We
will add, at least, a new one. The approach is otherwise non-parametric.
In order to organize the data one defines two time scales. The first one
δt is the interval of time that defines the returns: the return at time t,
rt = log(pt+δt) − log(pt). The second one is the temporal window ∆t that
bunches together the data from the time series to build a (time dependent)
statistical sample. For time scales below such value the variations of the
distribution parameters is, by definition, not observable. For time scales
larger their measurability is not given but depends, of course, on the signal
to noise plus systematic error ratio.
In the great majority of studies undertaken on these type of time series
1We do not rule out that one could build this parameter exploiting, for instance, the
time derivative of the volatility. See discussions below
2
the program is to fit a specific dynamic model with the final goal of partially
forecasting the future evolution. The family of ARCH models have been
extensively used with this purpose (see for instance the review: Bollerslev et
al (1994). In this approach parsimony is essential. If the model has too many
parameters, one falls into the overfitting trap and the extrapolation of the
model gives wrong forecasts. On the other hand, the choice of a model just
because of its simplicity, flexibility and/or parsimony does not justify leaving
aside a necessary preliminary and open-minded exploration of the data.
With this observation in mind we here take a step backwards and try
simply to find parameters that enable an interesting narration of the history
of the time series. We postpone on purpose any pretension to a dynamical
description of the data.
But apart from this difference in strategy, what we will propose can be
seen as a straightforward generalization of the Andersen et al (2003) proposal
of using realized volatilities. In few words we will take into consideration
something like a realized kurtosis, that is the kurtosis of the intraday returns
distribution. More precisely a proxy (or proxies) that similarly measure the
non-Gaussianity of the intraday return distribution but are less prone to
the small sample biases and/or easier to measure2. Bouchaud and Potters
(2000) have thoroughly discussed how the kurtosis of the returns distribution
decreases slowly with ∆t as a consequence of heteroskedasticity. Once the
time interval (and thus the finite sample) is determined the p-kurtosis to be
measured could partially come from an intra-∆t variation of the volatility.
We will not try to disentangle these different contributions but we will still
correct for the systematic, periodic, volatility intraday variation connected
with the opening and closing hours of the market (Andersen and Bollerslev,
1997). We will show that our p-kurtosis can be measured, is time dependent,
is persistent and to a large extent uncorrelated with the p-volatility.
There have been many studies done in the framework of ARCH models
and its relatives that include or allow for time dependent conditional kurto-
sis (see in particular Hansen (1994); Harvey and Siddiqui (1999); Jondeau
and Rockinger (2003); Brooks et al (2005); Dark (2010)). The conditional
kurtosis in ARCH-like models refer to the daily returns and not to the intra-
day shorter period returns. In addition its identification strictly depends on
2We will precede words with a p to refer to a chosen proxy i.e. p-kurtosis , p-volatiility.
Furthermore in all cases we normalize these p-kurtosis by substracting the corresponding
value taken by a pure Gaussian
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the parametric model because these models also include day to day volatil-
ity variation and disentangling both effects is model dependent. There is
no necessary connection between this conditional kurtosis and our realized
p-kurtosis. In any case we remark that those studies show that the null hy-
pothesis that the conditional kurtosis is constant in time is rejected but do
not add information about the actual time dependence including the possible
time persistence.
In the idealized world of continuous time models the attention necessar-
ily focuses on Jumps plus Diffusion models(Merton, 1976). With the advent
of high frequency data it becomes possible to calibrate these models with
a successful separation of the jumps from the Brownian continuous compo-
nent(Mancini (2001), Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004)). What dis-
tinguishes a jump from a continuous contribution is the sudden variation
of the return. For instance in one line of research(Mancini (2001), (2004)
and (2009)) if the price variation in a small time interval h is larger than a
specified deterministic threshold function of h (for instance hβ with β > 1)
then that variation is attributed to the jump component. If h could be taken
arbitrarily small then these methods would allow to identify all jumps. This
is obviously impossible because when h = δt is chosen too small the real
market process has nothing to do with a continuous time stochastic pro-
cess (see Bouchaud, Farmer and Lillo (2008) for a discussion of some of the
complexities of price formation at micro time scales). Therefore only jumps
large enough can be identified (Andersen et al , 2007) and these in general
are rather rare and do not show persistence3. On the other hand the non-
Gaussianity of the intraday returns that interests us (not the one of the daily
returns) would originate in these models both from the small and large jumps
and also from the intraday time variation of the volatility. Our approach is
different because we do not disentangle these factors and in compensation
discover an observable that has striking persistence in time and therefore
allows for a better filtering of the noise and can be interpreted as a market
state collective variable. There are, in this last respect, similarities with the
contemporary work of Bollerslev and Todorov (2011a and b): these authors
do start discussing the same specific time continuous model but they use it
instrumentally to propose a non-parametric way of studying the data. Their
reliance on the medium jumps to estimate the large ones and our use of prox-
3See however (Mancini and Reno`, 2011), specifically Figure 5.4 where clustering is
apparent (C.Mancini: private communication).
4
ies of the kurtosis are similar and their interpretation of it as a signal of fear
also implies that they consider it as a market state colective variable.
We want finally to mention similar attempts to define new market state
variables in the larger context provided by cross-sectional distributions of
share returns. In particular Borland (2009) points to some interesting sig-
nals that characterize the advent of a crisis. Due to a self organization that
increases the correlation among shares cross-sectional kurtosis decreases and
the dispersion increases in times of panic while the opposite occurs during
normal times. In a related paper Allez and Bouchaud (2011) confirm these re-
sults and in addition find new regularities affecting in particular the seasonal
intraday variability of returns that suggest a more general anti correlation
between kurtosis and dispersion.
In this paper we will analyze the 5 minutes returns of the S&P500 index
from 1 February 1983 to the 30th November 2004 for a total of approximately
5472 days. We will show that the evolution of the kurtosis proxy tells an
interesting story that is not contained in the daily quotes and volatilities. In
particular we will discuss the first 1500 days and specifically the approach
to the Black Monday Crash (19-October-1987). We choose ∆t equal to one
day. Therefore we will have 72 quotations up to September 1985 that then
increases to 78.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the
data and define the observables that we try to measure. We also discuss our
reasons to choose the 1 day period and the need to eliminate the first and
last hours of each session to derive cleaner data. In Section 3 we present
the results on the time autocorrelation of the p-kurtosis and thus justify
taking a 60 days exponential moving average and in a subsection we discuss
and show the historical evolution of the p-kurtosis. In section 4 we present
the Montecarlo simulations used to estimate errors in our measurements. We
also present 2 alternative definitions of the p-kurtosis, one based on quantiles
following Moors (1988) and another one, somehow noisier but sensitive only
to the excess number of returns on the tails of the distribution. Finally the
last section is dedicated to the conclusions and discussions.
2 The Data
As stated in the introduction our data consists of the 5 minutes S&P500
index quotations from February 1983 to the 30th November 2004 for a total
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of approximately 5472 days.
Notation: If qi,j are the index quotation on day i, period j, the discretely
sampled returns are denoted:
ri,j = log(qi,j+1)− log(qi,j) (1)
As discussed in the next paragraph we will disregard the data correspond-
ing to the first and last hours of every market session. Furthermore, we are
interested in the time evolution of the degree of non-Gaussianity of the in-
traday distribution and therefore we normalize the returns dividing by the
average value of the absolute value return on each day (similar to the so
called standardized (Andersen et al , 2000) returns).
r̂i,j =
ri,j
(
∑
m=1,npi
|ri,m|)/npi
where npi is the number of 5 minute periods on day i minus the 24 periods
corresponding to the opening and closing hours. We will use the notation
(ai,j)j, (ai,j)i=i1,i2 to indicate averages over periods on a fixed day and aver-
ages over a specific days interval respectively.
We concentrate our attention on the following parameters of the intraday
distribution:
Vi = (|ri,j)|)j
Ki = (r̂ 2i,j)j −
pi
2
These parameters p-volatility and p-kurtosis are proxies for the usual ones.
The p-kurtosis is zero for a normal distribution and grows if the latter be-
comes more leptokurtotic.
We have followed Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) in the analysis of the
variation of the volatility near the opening and closing hours. For this specific
calculation we eliminated those days with abnormally short sessions, in total
13 days. Even then we had days with 71, 72, 77 and 78 periods. Assuming
that it is the distance to the opening and closing moments that is relevant
we uniformized the data simply selecting 71 periods dropping those near
midday. For each one of these 71 daily periods we calculated the average of
the absolute return over all days to check and confirm that in the first and last
hours there is a large increase in the volatility. This variation will contribute
6
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Figure 1: Fig 1a shows a 5000 average of the normalized intraday volatility
once the first and last hours have been cancelled. Fig 2a shows the averages
over the periods: 1-500 (green), 1000-1500 (red), 2500-3000 (blue), 4000-4500
(black).
to the calculation of the p-kurtosis and obscure possible more interesting
contributions that reflect an evolving market state. Therefore we eliminated
from the data the first and last hour in every session. We then took partial
averages of the remaining hours over bunches of 500 days as well as a full
5000 days average to check whether there could be some important variation
with time. In Figure 1 we show the plots of the 5000 days average (Fig.
1a) and 4 partial averages corresponding to the periods 1-500, 1000-1500,
2500-3000, 4000-4500 of the following quantities:
(|ri,j|)i=1+(k−1)500,k500 with 1 ≤ j ≤ 47 ; k = 1, 3, 6, 9
The profiles are rather similar, the time dependence is insignificant. There
remains a residual intraday variation of the order of 30%. The estimated
value of the p-kurtosis thus generated is KFig.1 = 0.027 so values below or of
this order are not significant.
2.1 Why the choice ∆t = 1 day
With the cuts proposed in the last paragraph we are left with a modest num-
ber of time intervals each day. Therefore errors on the estimates of allegedly
“true” (whatever that means) PDF’s parameters could be rather large. An
immediate way to evade this would be to take ∆t of the order of a week
or a month. Then variation of the daily volatility inside that time interval
7
will generate additional p-kurtosis. There is therefore a trade-off: kurtosis
in those scales is not that interesting because there are many mechanisms
illustrated in as many models that explain variation of volatility in such
longer periods. For instance the herd effect/contagion (Lux and Marchesi,
2000), learning by agents (Brian Arthur et al , 1996), rational expectation of
a possible, unrealized Peso Problem (Veronesi, 2003) all produce both clus-
tering, persistence and variation of the volatility in time scales larger than
a day. But unless we stretch unrealistically those mechanisms and models,
they -and to the best of our knowledge all other models- do not explain the
non-gaussianity at the intraday frequency.
There remains still the other Null hypothesis i.e. that these fluctuations
are due to exogenous news arriving to the market. This possibility has been
carefully considered and ruled out by the work of Joulin et al (2009) who
cross-examined news arrivals and the observed jumps. In section 4 we will
show that our measurements are on the bulk compatible with theirs and add
some new evidence to their conclusions.
3 Persistence and evolution of the p-kurtosis
parameter
3.1 Persistence
If we calculate the time autocorrelations of the p-kurtosis and the p-volatility
as if the data were stationary:
C
(K)
t =
(KiKi+t)i=1,ntd−t
(KiKi)i=1,ntd
C
(V )
t =
(ViVi+t)i=1,ntd−t
(ViVi)i=1,ntd
we obtain the plots shown in Fig. 2: the correlation of the p-kurtosis falls to
0.3 after just one day but later shows remarkable persistence similar to the
persistence demonstrated by the p-volatility. It is reasonable to assume that
the big fall is to some extent due to errors introduced by our manipulation of
the data, a fact that will be checked with Montecarlo simulations in Section
4. At the same time the persistence suggests averaging the p-kurtosis over
many days to reduce this noise.
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Figure 2: Autocorrelations of the p-Kurtosis (red) and the p-Volatility (blue).
A natural question arises at this point: are the p-kurtosis and the p-
volatility strongly correlated. If the answer is positive then there would be
some hope of finding a universal profile for the probability distribution of
the returns. If they are not, the two parameters p-Volatility and p-Kurtosis
must have different interpretations. We have calculated these correlations in
different 600 days periods and it is in general small and varies wildly, being
sometimes positive and sometimes negative. This will be clarified in the next
subsection.
3.2 Historical profile of the p-kurtosis and the p-volatility
As the apparent scale invariant decrease of the correlations indicates, there
are multiple time scales relevant in the evolution.
Let us choose averaging both variables over 60 days period (more or less
corresponding to a quarter). We use an exponential moving average for this
purpose, therefore attenuating both noisy and real variations below that time
scale:
fma(t) =
∑t
i=t−60 e
i−t
60 f(i)∑t
i=t−60 e
i−t
60
(2)
In Fig. 3 we show the moving average of the p-Kurtosis together with
9
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Figure 3: Graphs of the exponential 60 days moving average of the p-Kurtosis
(red) and the p-Volatility (blue), this one multiplied by 1000. The green
curve represents Montecarlo simulations discussed in Sect.4 The large ticks
on the time axis correspond to special dates: 19-10-1987 crash, 13-10-1989
mini-crash, 07-1997 Asian financial crisis, 03-2000 dot-com bust)
the corresponding one of the p-Volatility conveniently normalized so that it
fits in the same graph. We can clearly see the persistence of both quan-
tities. At the same time it becomes apparent that there is no correlation
between the 2 observables at very long time scales: there are periods where
both increase or decrease and there are periods when one increases while the
other decreases. At shorter time scales there appears to be some interaction
between the two quantities. The fluctuations that we see in the figure could
have been introduced by our manipulation of the data. In the next Section
we will present Montecarlo simulations of a constant probability distribution
of returns manipulated exactly as the data. The fluctuating result is shown
in Figure 3 (Green curve). The discussion is left to the next Section.
The unavoidable immediate conclusion of this graph is that the impor-
tance of the historical context and narration can not be evaded. If the cor-
relation between p-Volatility and p-kurtosis in periods of 6 months comes
out sometimes positive and sometimes negative, the insistence in finding a
universal profile for the returns distribution simply crashes against reality.
The second observation is the striking difference in the approach to two
different crisis. There is a remarkable increase of the p-Kurtosis that seems to
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anticipate the October 1987 Crash while there is a decrease of the p-Kurtosis
during the approach to the dot-com bubble burst. We will discuss in the last
Section the possible reasons for this difference.
4 Analysis of errors and alternative proxies
Figure 2 proves beyond any reasonable doubt that the time evolution of the
p-kurtosis is real. We do not (and could not) claim that the value measured
any day reflects some kind of “real” parameter of the statistic ensemble of
that day data because our numerical manipulation surely biases the results.
In particular the relatively small sample and the normalisation of the data by
the daily p-volatility are guaranteed to reduce any kurtosis measure (in the
limit of a 1 period sample the measured p-kurtosis will be one; furthermore
the contribution of any period to the kurtosis is bounded by the number
of periods in the day), Finally the figure shows clear dispersion of the data
around a moving average. We want to know whether such fluctuations are
real fluctuations of the p-kurtosis or simply pure statistical fluctuations due
to the small sample or perhaps a mixture of both.
With those questions in mind we have done some Montecarlo simulations.
We assumed that the data could be reproduced by mixing two Gaussians and
fitted the 2 parameters: the ratio between the dispersions and the relative
amplitude using the p-kurtosis at the maximum and a second parameter:
K
(0)
i = (r̂
1/2
i,j )j −
Γ(3/4)
pi1/4
(3)
where the constant is there so that this parameter be zero for a pure Gaussian
distribution. For a leptokurtotic one it is generically negative
In addition we also considered an alternative normalisation of the re-
turns4:
r˜i,j =
ri,j∑
m,m 6=j |ri,m|/(npi − 1)
(4)
which has the apparent property of biasing in the opposite direction (for
samples with just one element the kurtosis becomes infinite). From the data
around the maximum value, few weeks before Black October Monday we
4we thenk J-Ph. Bouchaud for suggesting this variant
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measure: K = 0.77, Kb = 1.16, K
(0) = −0.042, K(0)b = −0.029. The parame-
ters of the mixed Gaussian were then adjusted to be:
a = 0.80 amplitude of the N(0, σ1)
σ1 = 0.62 (5)
σ2 = 2.54
We generated 5000 samples of 50 periods with this constant in time prob-
ability distribution and analysed them with the same method applied to the
S&P500 data. The first 350 points are drawn in Fig.3 (see caption) , The
mean values for the simulated K’s are: Ksim = 0.76, Ksimb = 1.19, K
(0) sim =
−0.042, K(0) simb = −0.027. The variances of these quantities are:√
var(Ksim) = 0.051√
var(Ksimb ) = 0.078 (6)√
var(K(0) sim) = 0.0029√
var(K
(0) sim
b ) = 0.0027
The first of these values can be used to draw error bars in Fig 3 though
we find the direct comparison of the simulated curve with the data more
illuminating. We also notice that K and Kb small sample biases are in
opposite directions as argued (the K calculated analytically for the mixed
Gaussian is 0.91). Finally if we want to believe in extrapolation, the kurtosis
derived from the mixed Gaussian distribution is 6.97, consistent with figures
appearing in the literature though here, if anything, it corresponds to the
maximum value of a quantity that evolves in time.
Comparing the fluctuations in Fig 3 of the real data and the simulations
we can conclude that a significant fraction of them are statistical errors conse-
quence of the manipulation of the data. But still some structure is apparent.
For instance some anticorrelation or correlation between bursts of p-volatility
and p-kurtosis is visible at least at time scales of the order of several months.
The next (future) challenge is to find a way to make this structure significant.
Finally we have experimented with alternative measures of the non-Gaussianity
depicted in Fig 4 and 5. Specifically we looked at the Moors (1988) kurtosis
defined using the octiles and a measure that is sensitive exclusively to the
tails. For the latter we followed Joulin et al (2009) and proceeded as follows:
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Figure 4: Graphs of the exponential 60 days moving average of the Moors
kurtosis defined by the Octiles Oi as
O7−O5+O3−O1
O6−O2 . The ticks are as in Fig 3
1. On each day we calculated the median and separated the data according
to whether they were larger or smaller than the median.
2. We computed the average value of the return V
(L)
i and V
(R)
i for both
groups.
3. We finally counted how many returns fell in the intervals (−∞, 4V (L)i )
and (4V
(R)
i ,∞)
This last measure is interesting because it depends exclusively on the tail,
does not mix a possible skewness with the kurtotic property and has robust
statistical properties. In a pure Gaussian the probability of an event falling
in that interval is 0.0014 equivalent to one event every 14 days. Instead the
figure shows that around the maximum, on the year 1987, there were 3 to
4 events per day. This value is compatible with the findings of Joulin et al
(2009) even if it is smaller because it is known that the S&P500 index is less
kurtotic than individual shares. Our analysis adds a new strong argument
in favour of that paper’s thesis: news are not necessarily at the origin of
the jumps. In fact the months before October 1987 is according to most
contemporary witnesses a period of minimum news and still is a period of
maximum number of jumps.
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Figure 5: Exponential 60 days moving average of the number of events falling
in the tails defined as in the text
5 Conclusions and Discussions
As told in the introduction the motivation for this work developed in a tor-
tuous path through psychology and epistemology. I sketch here the line of
reasoning that will be expanded in a future work.
At its origin there was a shapeless idea that uncertainty was not fully
considered in Economics even if the work of Knight, at least in the interpre-
tation implicit in the formalizations proposed by his followers, was taken into
account. This was compounded with the realization that in a larger context
(i.e. Agent Based Models and bounded rationality as proposed by Sargent
(1993)) learning was identified with induction when instead we know that, in
order to acquire knowledge (at least ampliative knowledge) something else,
for instance what C. S. Pierce called abduction, has to be invoked5 . This
mode of inference is essential in many cognitive processes, specifically, in
guessing a frame, that is which and how many variables are to be considered
relevant to a particular phenomena. It is inside that frame where induction
can work to adjust the model. The infinite variables left outside add noise
5”Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical
operation that introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value,
and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis” C. S. Peirce
C.P 5.171. See also Hintikka (1998)
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and the inductive optimum will be reached when that noise appears to be
perfectly random. We are left with a useful statistical model but uncertain
because the noise could be correlated with a variable outside the frame.
This uncertainty is irreducible inside the frame but is tolerated because
of the cost of exploring a very large number of variables (the curse of di-
mensionality). In most contexts the agent totally and rationally ignores it.
The attitude however has to change in a competitive environment. Another
agent may exploit correlations with variables assumed irrelevant and this will
affect non-linearly the model predictions: our agent has to remain aware of
the limitations of his/her frame. We then expect under-reaction of the agent
in front of small discrepancies because the trust in the model is limited and
over-reaction, i.e. jerkily following the market and restricting the supply of
liquidity if the discrepancy becomes large enough.
We recognize that this is somehow speculative. We would need both an
Agent Based Model to check that the effect does not disappear in the bulk
and perhaps even classroom experiments to measure the reactions.
On the other hand the validity of the work exposed in the rest of this
paper does not depend on these considerations/motivations. The key result
is the surprising long time scale evolution of the different measures of the
non-Gaussianity of the intraday data. As far as we know the observation
of the slow increase culminating in the Black Monday October 87 crash as
well as the still slower decrease that traverses the whole burst of the dot-
com bubble have not been noticed before and deserve some explanation and
further study.
We mention en passant that they are compatible with our previous spec-
ulations. The dot-com burst was highly anticipated. Private conversations
with the protagonists confirm that they knew they were living through a bub-
ble but the incentives to stay in the market were important. The uncertainty
was about the timing of the burst, how to maximize profits before that date
and strategies to leave the market when the moment arrived. Those with
different predictions were confident in their models and therefore perfectly
happy to bet on the outcome in spite of the large risk. They were closely
following signals coming from the economy and this produced turbulence
but on a longer time scale. Just the opposite was happening before Octo-
ber 1987: at that moment the post-mortem analysis done by Shiller (1989)
through interviews of the protagonists found that most investors did not pin-
point one specific arriving news as causing the existing recognized state of
anxiety. They were worried by the psychology of fellow investors and had a
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gut feeling that the market was overvalued. The continuous growth of the
index since the end of Volcker tightening was not totally understood. In a
few words they had diminished trust on their models but did not know how
to correct them. In fact we know a-posteriori that the models did not need
any correction.
In addition to a more detailed discussion of our motivations many inter-
esting problems remain opened. First of all the connection with the Jumps
analysis of Bollerslev and Todorov (2011a and b) that will presumably re-
quire repeating our analysis with the S&P 500 future index which is more
commonly used in high frequency data. Then also the shorter time scale evo-
lution apparent in the graphs has to be made statistically significant and then
further historical analysis will be necessary. Last, but not least, the compar-
ison and cross-examination with the options market may provide important
clues(Bates, 1990).
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